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Despite their contribution to employment, food security, poverty eradication, and community 
well-being, small-scale fisheries often find themselves in a disadvantageous position globally 
relative to large-scale fisheries and other industries competing for marine space, resources, 
and government attention. By and large, small-scale fisheries are marginalized in every sense 
of the word: culturally, socially, economically, geographically, legally, and politically. Their 
unfavorable status is frequently perceived to be both a cause and effect of overfishing, 
unsustainable fishing practices, and governance failure; thus, their potential to modernize 
while participating in and delivering on sustainable development goals is less than optimal. 
Given that the majority of the world’s fisheries are small-scale, it is imperative that major 
changes take place in the conditions that determine the predicament of small-scale fisheries. 
For these reasons, in 2014 FAO member states endorsed the Voluntary Guidelines for 
Securing Sustainable Small-Scale Fisheries in the Context of Food Security and Poverty 
Eradication (SSF Guidelines), with the aim of encouraging states and civil society 
organizations to take steps to bring about the changes needed to improve the sustainability 
and viability of small-scale fisheries. The SSF Guidelines call for broad and complex 
governance interventions; however, as much as they can help create transformation within 
small-scale fisheries, governance systems themselves must also be transformed before real 
change can take place. Based on the analysis of 34 case studies of small-scale fisheries 
governance around the world, our synthesis reveals that small-scale fisheries governance is 
indeed undergoing different types of transformation and can take place in all governing 
modes. Further, these transformations occur at the operational, institutional, and the meta-
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“The rate of change is often of no less importance than the direction 
of the change itself; but while the latter frequently does not depend 
upon our volition, it is the rate at which we allow change to take 
place which well may depend upon us.”   
Karl Polanyi: The Great Transformation: 1944/1957. 
Boston: Beacon Press, pp. 36-37.  
 
1. Introduction 
Prior to the adoption of the Voluntary Guidelines for Securing Sustainable Small-Scale 
Fisheries in the Context of Food Security and Poverty Eradication (SSF Guidelines) by FAO 
member states in June 2014 (FAO 2015), small-scale fisheries had been mostly ignored by 
governments. This marginal status contrasts with the fact that the majority of the world’s 
fisheries are small-scale. The SSF Guidelines offer a rare opportunity to form the high-level 
commitments that are required for states and other actors to take on in order to promote the 
sustainability of small-scale fisheries. The SSF Guidelines call upon states and civil society 
organizations to take concrete action to bring small-scale fishers and fish workers out of the 
impoverished and marginalized situation they often find themselves in on a global scale.  
In FAO’s SOFIA reports (State of the World’s Fisheries and Aquaculture) 
(http://www.fao.org/3/a-i5555e.pdf), the importance of small-scale fisheries is often 
highlighted, in terms of their provision of food, income, and employment to millions of 
people. According to the 2010 report, about 120 million people work full-time or part-time in 
fisheries-related jobs, of which more than 90% are small-scale. Other estimates show that 
small-scale fisheries contribute about ¼ to the world’s total (Pauly and Zeller 2016) and about 






































































Achieving both sustainability and viability in small-scale fisheries is an ambitious 
goal. As noted in the 2016 SOFIA report, “declining fisheries resources; degraded aquatic 
habitats; other more-powerful sectors outcompeting small-scale fishing communities for 
access to land and water; unequal power relations; lack of access to services; and limited 
participation in decision-making, often leading to unfavorable policies and practices within 
and beyond the sector” (FAO 2016, XX). This report further observes that inadequate 
governance structures often fail to provide the necessary support. Thus, despite their actual 
and potential contribution, the intractable – or “wicked” - problems facing small-scale 
fisheries must be dealt with for the sake of small-scale fishers, fish workers and their 
communities, as well as for society at large which benefits from their services. This, we argue, 
is essentially a governability challenge (Bavinck et al. 2013), meaning that the problem may 
easily get out of hand and be beyond the existing quality and capacity of governing 
institutions.    
The SSF Guidelines call for multiple interventions to improve the working conditions 
of small-scale fisheries. Indeed, they also emphasize the need for the transformation of 
governance systems, given that they do not always work in the interest of small-scale 
fisheries. The question is how one advances from the situation described in 2016 SOFIA 
report to the future envisaged in the SSF Guidelines, especially when the governance 
structures are ineffective. How would such reforms come about when “unequal power 
relations” and “limited participation in decision-making” constitute existing governance 
structures to begin with? If transformation is indeed required, questions remain whether it 
should be incremental or it should happen drastically, whether it should be marginal or 
fundamental change, or whether it should be systemic or partial. 
We assume that the transformation, be it direction, degree or rate, depends on the 




































































in other instances, like when crisis looms, “transformative opportunity” (Unger 2004: 424-
425) may allow radical reform. Notably, any change, whether gradual or abrupt, marginal or 
fundamental, does not take place in a power vacuum. Institutional reform is often politically 
contested and resisted, resulting in minor alteration, even if a total overhaul (transformation) 
would have been justified. In other instances, the current structure is entrenched to a degree 
that any change may be difficult or unimaginable. 
Small-scale fisheries governing actors should be prepared for all of the above as they 
proceed with the implementation of the SSF Guidelines. Because transformation can differ 
from one fishery to the next, learning about possible avenues for these transformations to take 
place is imperative. Through a systematic examination of 34 case studies from around the 
world, published as an edited volume titled “Interactive governance for small-scale fisheries: 
global reflections” (Jentoft and Chuenpagdee 2015), we employ interactive governance theory 
(Kooiman 2003; Kooiman et al. 2005; Bavinck et al. 2013) in ordering the different 
transformations found in the case studies and in exploring the governing mode that they are 
situated in and gravitating towards. By so doing, the paper provides insights into how to 
analyze changes in the governance system, how to facilitate transformation towards 
sustainable and viable small-scale fisheries promoted in the SSF Guidelines.   
 
2. Conceptualizing governance transformation 
Although the governance concept has ancient roots, current definitions reflect recent societal 
demands and the consequent change of governing practices. This change can be identified as a 
transformative move from a top-down, hierarchical approach with government at the steering 
wheel, towards a more cooperative, network and partnership-based system, where civil 
society takes on some of the governing functions (Rhodes 1996; Van Leeuwen and Van 




































































than government…” This idea of modern governance is indicative of the complexity of the 
challenges facing governments today, like those expressed in the 2015 UN Sustainable 
Development Goals  (SDGs) (http://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/sustainable-
development-goals/). As Delmas and Young (2009:3) observe, “We live in an era in which 
the demand for governance arising from human-environment interactions or, more broadly, 
the quest for sustainable development, is growing, while confidence in the capacity of 
government – the conventional mechanism for handling such matters – to address problems of 
governance is waning.”  Thus, SDG 17, “Revitalize the global partnership for sustainable 
development,” is expressing the need for building governance partnerships, involving 
governments, civil society and the private sector in order to achieve the SDGs. 
However, a move from government to governance raises a range of challenges, for 
instance related to accountability, transparency, legitimacy, participation and power. Also, 
there are issues pertaining to the division of labor as to who within the governing system are 
better equipped to do what. There are certainly some functions that only the state government 
can handle, or can perform better than other actors (Peters and Pierre 2016); thus the state 
remains a powerful actor in the new governance (Bell and Hindmore 2009). The SSF 
Guidelines have good reasons for addressing the state the way they do but they also explicitly 
recognize the role that other actors, like civil society organizations, local communities and the 
research institutions, play in the implementation of the Guidelines.  
The move from government to governance involves a qualitative shift in the way the 
governing system is structured and operates. We define this movement as a transformative 
shift with normative overtones, i.e. it is believed to improve the effectiveness and quality of 
governing. It is, however, also a subject matter for empirical research, for instance, pertaining 
to “transformative opportunities”: How, and under which condition, does such a move occur? 




































































analysis of the published case studies of fisheries governance systems and practices. Is the 
move from government to governance in small-scale fisheries taking place in similar manners 
around the world? If so, why, how and with what consequences from a governability 
perspective? 
As originally theorized by Kooiman (2003), and employed for our research, governing 
is perceived as taking place within three ideal ‘modes’: hierarchical governance, co-
governance, and self-governance. In the first instance, governing is top-down and is usually, 
but not necessarily, conducted from the apex of government. In the second, co-governance 
occurs from within a partnership between government, civil society, and industry 
stakeholders. In the latter instance, governing is performed without interference from an 
external authority, and is left to the stakeholders themselves at a community or group level. In 
reality, and as revealed in our analysis, governance modes are neither clear-cut nor stable 
(Pierson 2004) but take place in hybrid forms that evolve over time as an adaptation to 
changing political, economic, or ecological circumstances (Jay 2013; Ménard 2004; Jentoft 
2007). A governing system must fit the challenge as presented by the system-to-be governed. 
Therefore, we should “cast our net wide in thinking about new forms of governance” (Delmas 
and Yong 2009: 6). However, as ideal types, the three ‘modes’ are meant to inspire research 
questions. Do actual governance systems and practices conform or deviate with one or 
another mode? If so, why and with what outcomes? Over time, does one governance mode 
transform into another, and for which reasons?  
Governance, as explained by Kooiman (2003), also occurs at meta-, second- and first-
orders. At the meta-order, fundamental governing elements like images, values, and principles 
are established - explicitly or implicitly - through deliberation or otherwise. Second-order 
governance is about how to design institutions in ways that correspond with the meta-order 




































































routine, problem-solving work at the first-order. What one means by “good governance” in a 
particular circumstance with respect to small-scale fisheries needs to be examined through all 
three orders. Since orders and modes of governance are interrelated, an understanding of the 
three orders under each mode is thus called for. In other words, as illustrated in Table 1, one 
would explore the meta-order values, images, and principles, the institutional design (second 
order), and the governing routines and practices (first order) for hierarchical, co-, and self-
governance. The fact that the values, images, and principles are often not expressed in a 
formal sense does not imply that they are not there. In many instances, meta-order images, 
values, and principles linger tacitly in the first- and second-order (Song et al. 2013). A key 
subject for further examination, which our analysis has explored, is to what extent moving 
between the three governing orders, such as in a process of learning, is triggering the change 
of modes.  
 




Hierarchical Co-governance Self-governance 
First-order Government is 
responsible for 
ensuring that human 
resources, 
infrastructure, and 
procedures are in place 
to deal effectively and 
timely with issues and 
challenges as 
described in SSF 
Guidelines 





(including costs) of 
developing and 
implementing 
mechanisms to deal 
with urgent problems 
in small-scale fisheries 







and have mechanisms 
to deal with conflicts 
and problems that 
arise, as anticipated in 
the SSF Guidelines 
Second-order Government is capable 
of analyzing why 
certain rules and 
regulations are more 
effective than others 
and formulating 
Mechanisms are in 
place for government 
and small-scale 
fisheries organizations 




their own legitimate 
process to create and 
implement rules and 






































































strategies in line with 
the SSF Guidelines 
conflicts, etc., and to 





envisaged in the SSF 
Guidelines 
the broader established 
goals and principles as 
prescribed in the SSF 
Guidelines, policies by 
the government or 





diversity of values and 
images in small-scale 
fisheries, and is able to 
align its policies and 
strategies in accord 
with the governance 
principles in the SSF 
Guidelines in support 
of these values and 
images 
Mechanisms are in 
place to enable 
government and small-
scale fisheries 
organization to discuss 
differences in values 
and images and 
develop a common 
vision and goals for 
small-scale fisheries 
governance that align 
with the principles 




their own process to 
address diverse values 
and images and work 
towards developing a 
common vision and 
goals that align with 
the principles 
promoted in the SSF 
Guidelines 
 
When implementing the SSF Guidelines’ principles, one would expect convergence towards 
the co-governance mode through an engagement of small-scale fishers and fishing 
communities, who are legitimate stakeholders in decision-making and management, as 
implied in paragraph 5.15:  
 
“States should facilitate, train and support small-scale fishing communities to 
participate in and take responsibility for, taking into consideration their legitimate 
tenure rights and systems, the management of the resources on which they depend for 
their well-being and that are traditionally used for their livelihoods. Accordingly, 
States should involve small-scale fishing communities – with special attention to 
equitable participation of women, vulnerable and marginalized groups – in the design, 




































































protected areas, affecting their livelihood options. Participatory management systems, 
such as co-management, should be promoted in accordance with national law.” 
 
We argue here that without a consideration of the three orders, participatory governance 
remains a thorny undertaking. A move to co-management, for instance, needs support at the 
meta-order like a democratic ethos, enabling legislation at the second order, and active small-
scale fisheries stakeholders at the first order. 
As ‘ideal types’, the governing orders and modes combined serve as heuristics for 
empirical research, guiding questions such as: What explains the disparity between empirical 
modes/orders and theoretical ones? What difference does this gap make for the governability 
of small-scale fisheries in concrete cases? If a particular mode works well in one setting, why 
not in another? Are different first-order performances related to different institutional designs 
at the second order, or different images, norms, and principles at the -order? By applying the 
framework, as depicted in Table 1, on concrete case studies, we derive a foundation for 
hypothesizing about the chances of successful transformation of governance in accordance 
with the principles and practical recommendations laid out in the SSF Guidelines.  
 
3. Analysis of transformation in different governing modes 
Drawing from 34 case studies that have already been published in Jentoft and Chuenpagdee 
(2015), our paper analyzes different transformations of the governing mode occurring in these 
cases, which cover small-scale fisheries in developed (11 cases) and developing countries (23 
cases). Specifically, we examine how the governing system interacts with the social and the 




































































 Modes obviously have a history in each specific context. They may have evolved 
gradually through a policy processes internal or external to the fisheries industry. They may 
have resulted from a deliberate collective choice made at a specific time in response to a 
concrete problem, like a resource crisis. Whatever their origin, governing modes have 
researchable consequences, which, from a governability perspective, could be positive or 
negative (i.e. dysfunctional or in violation of good principles). The analysis of transformation 
in all three governing modes explores the interactions (communication, deliberation, 
negotiation, directive, etc.) between the governing system on the one hand and the system-to-
be-governed on the other. Interactions between these two systems may take place in a formal 
or informal setting, and may occur more or less spontaneously. They may also be variable, 
frequent, and intense. Yet, as Kooiman (2003) argues, they are the linkages between societal 
attributes and governance qualities. 
 
3.1 Building capacity for transformation in hierarchical governance  
As previously noted, the SSF Guidelines primarily address states as their main audience. 
Sentences starting with “States should…” appear 75 times in the document. Thus, it is fair to 
conclude that the member states that negotiated and then endorsed the SSG Guidelines share a 
belief in the responsibilities and capacities of central government. Nevertheless, like 
interactive governance, the SSF Guidelines do not assert that the state alone should be 
involved. In addition to emphasizing the engagement of civil society organizations and 
fisheries stakeholders in the implementation of the SSF Guidelines, the document gives 
prominence to the building of partnerships. However, the often complex, multi-level, and 
fragmented nature of the governing system poses difficulties for the coordination, integration, 
and formulation of a holistic and inclusive policy agenda. Asymmetrical power relations also 




































































Misuse of state power often leads to governance failure. Hadjimichael (2015) 
illustrates how fisheries governance in Cyprus faces several challenges such as overfishing, 
economic viability, conflicts over access to space and resource, as well as power struggles not 
only between different gear like trawls, long lines, purse seines, and the recreational sector, 
but also between fishers and the authorities. Complex and dysfunctional interactions 
characterize these relationships, which are made worse by the state’s strategy of ‘divide and 
conquer,’ and the lack of effort to genuinely engage all sectors in public consultation. Small-
scale fishers are generally left disempowered and eventually become dependent on the 
authorities. She argues that, in order to enhance governability, governing capacity needs to be 
built, along with new institutions and improved policies that enable the meaningful 
participation of small-scale fishers. 
Poor performance of the governing system under the hierarchical mode is also 
observed in mainland Ecuador due mainly to mismatches in legal frameworks, ill-defined 
social boundaries, and the use of inappropriate mechanisms to mobilize information 
(Barragán-Paladines 2015). Nevertheless, in its current form, national laws and legal 
instruments are implemented, with management plans in place. She argues that, rather than 
aiming to transform into a co-governance mode, as is the case with the Galapagos, it might be 
as important to strengthen the commitment of the national authorities. This government 
commitment would encourage national agencies to be more proactive in addressing the 
fisheries problems, taking into consideration that small-scale fishers and communities should 
be involved in crafting solutions.  
In Newfoundland and Labrador, Canada, the hierarchical governance mode involves 
multiple agencies at various levels, including local, provincial, federal, and supranational, 
thus posing challenges in ensuring the coordination of policies, rules, and regulations (Song 




































































existing fisheries policies, such as fleet rationalization, capacity reduction, and international 
trades, seem to be skewed in favor of large-scale, industrialized fisheries. For transformation 
to happen, the authors argue that governments need to make use of local capacity through 
fishers’ associations and community-based organizations to create an inclusive platform for 
conversation in pursuit of setting an inclusive vision for governance.  
Conditions and capacity that need to exist for successful transformation under the 
hierarchical mode are illustrated in the case of the Alaskan fisheries (Soliman 2015). While 
the use of market-based instruments like individual transferable quotas (ITQs) to manage 
fisheries is controversial, they can be designed to support small-scale fisheries, as done by the 
North Pacific Management Council in the form of ‘community quota entities’ (CQEs). In 
principle, the program is tailored to the local context, as it aims to make quotas available for 
lease to communities. Financial and logistical barriers exist, however, limiting the purchase of 
quota shares under this program. As one of the few working CQEs, the Old Harbor program 
contains features that promote small-scale fisheries sustainability and enhance governability 
through encouraging investments and development of affirmative action policies and 
supportive financing structures. 
Prescott et al. (2015) offer another consideration for governance transformation using 
the example of the small-scale purse seine fishery in Rote Island in eastern Indonesia. The 
governing system in this case is hierarchical but operates at the local level (i.e. district) amidst 
informal management arrangements, including many local and customary laws. They suggest 
that while co-governance may offer an important opportunity to strengthen democracy and 
lead to local empowerment, what is ultimately required is strong support from government in 
the form of legitimate legislation that recognizes the need to safeguard fisheries boundaries 
and maintain the functionality of district level governance. The role of government in this 




































































replacement of harmful subsidies with more productive ones to incentivize actions such as the 
development of mechanisms to improve governing interactions and empower small-scale 
fishers to engage in the governance process. 
Successful transformation in governance depends not only on the present situation but 
also on past events. Ferrer (2015) reveals the importance of ‘step zero’ in the case study of 
Taklong Island National Marine Reserve in the Philippines, which was considered non-
functional due to the lack of representativeness and involvement of small-scale fisheries in the 
initial planning process. Further, the Department of Environment and Natural Resources was 
not able to create good quality interactions between key stakeholders, leading to the 
inadequate exchange of information.  
The negative consequence of the lack of fishers’ participation in decision-making is 
also observed in the case of small-scale octopus fisheries in Portugal. Pita et al. (2015) 
describe poor communication, weak collaboration, and limited understanding about the 
resource as underlying causes for low performance in governance, characterized by 
inappropriate monitoring and assessment and a lack of intervention by authorities in fisheries 
management. With the new Common Fisheries Policy of the European Union, moving 
towards co-governance may be a real possibility. These authors argue that such a reform 
would require trust building between fishers and the authorities.  
Transformation in the structure and function of the governing system is also necessary 
to deal with issues of scale mismatch and institutional fit. The greater the mismatch, the more 
fundamental the change (transformation) needs to be in order to attain the fit. This problem 
can be as fundamental as the lack of a clear definition about what small-scale fisheries are, 
which is a common situation in many countries around the world. This is partly why the SSF 
Guidelines only provide a broad statement about the characteristics of small-scale fisheries, 




































































Kraan (2015) argue that the lack of a precise definition is highly problematic in the 
Netherlands, since it reflects a poor understanding about what small-scale fisheries are, which 
may then disadvantage small-scale fishers when it comes to decision-making about fisheries. 
As previously discussed, the difficulty in the definition is due to the diversity, complexity, 
dynamics, and scale of operation in small-scale fisheries. A ‘flexible’ definition may thus be 
more appropriate than a fixed one. The Dutch government has been working on rectifying the 
situation by working with a group of Wadden Sea fishers in an experimental ‘integrated 
fishery’ that allows fishers to obtain a group license as opposed to individual ones, so that a 
variety of gears and techniques can be used. According to De Vos & Kraan (2015), in 
addition to reducing costs and sustaining higher yield, the program will also help improve 
cooperation between fishers and government officials. 
Under the hierarchical governance mode, government needs to be sensitive to the 
boundary issues associated with the natural and social systems involved in fisheries, which 
may not align with those of the institutions that are designed to govern them. Examples from 
Sri Lanka (Scholtens 2015) and Colombia (Randin 2015) show that small-scale fishers are 
subjected to external pressures beyond their control. In the case of Sri Lanka, conflicts arise 
between Indian trawlers that transgress national boundaries and occupy the traditional inshore 
fishing space of small-scale fishers. According to the SSF Guidelines, it is in the purview of 
the governments of both countries to use whatever means available to them to address these 
rights and access issues affecting small-scale fisheries. However, governments have other 
priorities and large-scale fisheries usually have the backing of the government. Thus, unless 
small-scale fisheries are organized and able to mobilize support from other stakeholders, 
including environmental organizations or human rights watch groups, their concerns would 




































































South Africa illustrates another kind of mismatch with the implementation of marine 
protected areas (MPAs) adjacent to small-scale fishing communities. Sowman (2015) notes a 
‘power mismatch’ between people who depend on fisheries resources for livelihoods and 
those who promote conservation. Impediments to governance also include different values 
and worldviews and the absence of shared principles and a common vision, which leads to 
contested interpretations of policy and law and a lack of consensus about management 
approaches and resolutions to problems. The author argues that the persistence of the state-
centric and natural science-based approach to governance adopted by fisheries management 
and conservation authorities is one of the main obstacles for governability. Unless these 
mismatches and differences are recognized and understood, governance transformation 
remains a faraway goal. 
Finally, small-scale fisheries are exposed to external threats that have social, political, 
and environmental externalities, which affect their livelihoods and viability. In Cochin 
backwater in Kerala, India, these threats include urbanization, tourism, and industrial 
development (Sathyapalan and George 2015). With no skill set to engage in employment in 
other sectors or financial assets, small-scale fishers have weak adaptive capacity to cope with 
this new situation. There is also no platform for fishers or other stakeholders, such as medium 
and large industries, the port authority, tourism operators, and inland water navigation sectors 
to negotiate issues pertaining to backwaters use and conservation. Consequently, the health of 
the ecosystem, as well as the fisheries resource system, has deteriorated under hierarchical 
governance. Sathyapalan & George (2015) suggest that governability in this case is low 
because of the disconnect between the Fisheries Department and local level organizations 
representing small-scale fisheries like the Panchayats, despite the decentralization that is 




































































with significant political will, need to occur in order to empower the Panchayats to play an 
active role in the management of the backwaters. 
 
3.2 Reforming institutions in co-governance 
Many case studies that we analyze speak to the importance of institutional transformation in 
order for the co-governance mode to function. In the Belize lobster fishery, Monnereau & 
McConney (2015) reveal that, with support and commitment from the state, fishing 
cooperatives are able to play a pivotal role in fisheries management, serving as intermediaries 
between small-scale fishers and the government. This has led to the government granting 
exclusive rights over the export of lobster and all other seafood to the fishing cooperatives, 
which are owned and operated by fishers, with benefits distributed among members. Further, 
the state puts other protective measures to secure profits for the fishers such as rejecting 
requests from foreign firms or large commercial companies to harvest, process, or export fish. 
In addition to the cooperatives, national and international non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) are also influential in fisheries governance, especially through the establishment of 
MPAs. Monnereau & McConney (2015) show that moving from hierarchical to co-
governance would likely face several institutional hurdles, like in the case of Jamaica where 
efforts to manage the lobster fishery have not been fruitful. Another good example of the need 
for specific institutional design for successful co-governance is in Malawi, as pointed out by 
Hara et al. (2015). In both Lake Malombe and Lake Malawi, problems with overfishing are 
expected to continue unless roles and authorities to limit access, regulate outputs, and 
determine fishing tenure are properly devolved to the beach village committee, the co-
governing body of the fisheries in these lakes. 
However, having the right institutions alone is not a sufficient condition for 




































































organizations, the quality of the interactions between government and other actors, and the 
institutional adaptability to external drivers of change are key to success. In researching seven 
small-scale shellfish fisheries in Latin America, they found that when facing crises small-
scale fishers were able to come together and work collaboratively to re-organize and adjust 
their harvesting practices and trading strategies based on their experiences. These new 
arrangements were enabled by the partnership between cooperatives, government agencies, 
research communities, and NGOs. The ability to adapt to changing conditions is also 
emphasized in the sea urchin fishery of Barbados and St. Lucia (Cox and McConney 2015). 
Factors and conditions favoring successful co-management include having a well-defined 
resource system, clear property rights, commitment to support a long-term institutional 
building process, and openness of participants to share and draw upon a plurality of 
knowledge systems. They added that fisheries stakeholders need room to explore options and 
test ideas, so that learning can be internalized in order for them to become more creative and 
innovative in their co-management efforts.  
Transformation towards co-management is also happening in Senegal. The added 
challenge in their situation is the influence of international actors who often bring their own 
principles and solutions to the problems at hand without understanding the local contexts. 
Thus, Hurley & Manel (2015) argue for better coordination between actors and across scales, 
emphasizing the importance of incorporating fishers’ values and perspectives as well as local 
knowledge in the participatory process, whether for research or decision-making. Other 
examples of threats from outside actors in a co-management system can be found in the small-
scale kelp harvesting in the French Iroise Sea and in the Canary Islands, Spain. In both cases, 
new actors came with the introduction of MPAs. According to Frangoudes & Garineaud 
(2015), the kelp fishery in the Iroise Sea has a long history of co-governance between kelp 




































































also played a key governing role as they collaborated with kelp harvesters to control 
production in order to prevent over-exploitation. Different governance arrangements took 
place with the introduction of quotas and other rules to regulate kelp harvesting and the 
creation of the National Marine Park of Iroise Sea. The park, in this case, is granted a veto 
right if they consider economic development to have negative impacts on the ecosystem. 
The new actor in the case of the Canary Islands is the recreational fishing sector, 
which is higher in number and bigger in economic power compared with small-scale fishers, 
and which is demanding inclusion in the governing process (Pascual-Fernández et al. 2015). 
They are also not alone in making the demand; other actors such as surfers, scuba divers, and 
tourism operators all want their needs to be considered. Since the marine reserves in Canary 
Islands are meant to support small-scale fisheries instead of excluding them, thus aligning 
conservation with sustainability, small-scale fishers have some advantages in the governance 
process. While involving recreational fishers and other new actors in the discussion about 
MPAs may help improve governability, some capacity building is required on the part of the 
new actor. In addition, some adjustments need to be made to the existing institutional 
arrangement and there must be new learning among the involved actors about the different 
expectations that each stakeholder group might have for the MPAs. 
While co-governance seems like a preferred mode towards which many countries are 
gravitating, additional challenges need to be recognized in the context of post-war and civil 
conflict. Khan & Sei (2015) capture this in their investigation of the effort in Sierra Leone to 
establish co-management systems, along with the introduction of territorial user rights and 
MPAs, which were instituted to promote stewardship and participatory decision-making. The 
decade of civil unrest in the 1990s weakened local institutional capacity, however, making it 
difficult for fishers to engage in monitoring and other management activities. With global 




































































considering the nested or multi-level governance system associated with fisheries in that 
country. 
Finally, co-governance can result from an eroding self-governance system, as argued 
by Finkbeiner et al. (2015) in their investigation of the situations in Baja California, Mexico, 
and Hawaiian Islands. The weakening of the communal arrangements and fishing 
cooperatives in the former and the annulment of the marine tenure system through statehood 
in the latter, coupled with increasing state intervention, demographic shifts, technological 
change, and globalization, provided an impetus for instituting co-management as an 
alternative governing system. Despite the strong constitutional backing in both cases, the lack 
of capacity at the state and community levels has limited the advancement of co-governance 
in Hawai’i. Greater success is found in the Mexican case, which has had a longer experience 
with the process, although power imbalances continue to impede progress.  
 
3.3 Understanding the roles and responsibilities of self-governance actors 
Self-governance is perhaps the least-described system in our study, despite its long tradition 
and the recognition that it has been essential in maintaining fishers’ rights, cultural integrity, 
and autonomy in governance. Several normative statements are often made about the value of 
a ‘bottom-up’ approach to governance, where communities are empowered to govern their 
own activities, asserting that this approach should lead to stewardship and sustainable use of 
natural resources, as well as fair and just use arrangements, especially in the absence of other 
strong institutions (White and Vogt 2000). Others argue that self-governed initiatives may not 
be as efficient to promote biodiversity protection due to internal conflicts, increasing external 
pressures, including globalized markets, and demographic change (Roe et al. 2000; Berkes et 




































































and, if instituted, would build relationships to other communities in the vicinity. A better 
understanding of the factors that limit and support self-governance and what self-governing 
actors need to do to deal with changing conditions is thus necessary. 
Some forms of self-governance can be found when small-scale fisheries organize 
themselves to manage certain aspects of their fisheries, abiding as they do within existing 
regulatory frameworks. While local empowerment and stakeholder engagement in governance 
are considered good traits for improving overall governability, they are not always well 
received, especially when they challenge the authorities of the state and affect other resource 
users. This was the case with San Felipe community in Yucatan, Mexico, where local fishers 
initiated a MPA in the fishing ground in front of their community as a preventive measure 
against over-exploitation. As described by Salas et al. (2015), the community faced resistance 
from both the state government and neighboring fishing communities, arguing that they had 
no legal rights to restrict the access of other fishers who also fished in the area. It took several 
years of relationship building and collaboration, along with support from researchers, before 
the importance of the protected area for the future of the fisheries became clear to everyone. A 
lesson on self-governance in this case highlighted the need to communicate and to develop a 
common vision and shared goals.  
There are a few well-known fisheries self-governance regimes around the world. The 
South Pacific Islands, for instance, are recognized for their system of customary rights known 
as qoliqoli (Cooke and Moce 1995). Another example is from Lake Victoria prior to the 
colonial period, when clan elders had exclusive rights to make decision about when fishing 
should take place (Onyango 2004). According to Onyango (2015), this tribal governance 
system aligns with the self-governance mode; even though it was hierarchical, decision-
making power and responsibilities rested upon the tribe leaders. The self-governance system 




































































a co-management system operates in Lake Victoria through the establishment and 
involvement of beach management units at the local level and with the Lake Victoria 
Fisheries Organization operating as a tripartite interstate regional level governance body, 
representing Tanzania, Kenya, and Uganda in the joint management of Lake Victoria 
fisheries. 
Nearby in Chwaka Bay, Zanzibar, the self-governance process is rife with conflicts 
between villages due to the diversity of values and opposing interests. Lindström & de la 
Torre-Castro (2015) consider the system ‘unsustainable’, arguing for the need to move from 
self-governance to a form of co-governance in which the state plays a role. The importance of 
an in-depth knowledge of the small-scale fisheries system, particularly the cultural-cognitive 
and other normative aspects underpinning de facto management actions, as well as how they 
may limit opportunities for conservation and sustainability, is emphasized. A lesson for self-
governance from this case study is that it does not necessarily lead to achieving governance 
goals and community participation in state-led rules and decision-making is still necessary. 
Success stories in self-governance often emerge in the context of conservation efforts. This 
was the case in Thailand, according to Jones et al. (2015), who document how 
decentralization took place in 1999 to encourage the participation of communities in the 
administration of local affairs, as well as the management of natural resources. Their 
investigation in six coastal villages along the Andaman coast reveals that communities with a 
strong capacity for self-governance were able to garner support from their members in 
addressing problems of fisheries decline and resource degradation. Building on trust and 
cooperation within the community, villagers respected rules and were willing to take part in 
enforcement, mainly to prohibit outsiders from fishing in restricted areas or conservation 
zones. Even without formal enforcement capacity, social sanction was applied, along with 




































































However, the movement from the state-controlled centralized system to participative 
governance and self-control can have detrimental effects to the viability of small-scale 
fisheries. Høst (2015) illustrates this in his analysis of the Danish demersal fisheries after the 
introduction of private property rights. Here, market-based fisheries management has altered 
the social and material dynamics of fleets such that small-scale fishers are no longer able to 
properly participate in the fisheries. Essentially, they lack the means and capacity to cope with 
increasing fishing costs and the new regulatory demands associated with quota management, 
which predominantly favors large-scale, high volume fisheries. Despite the rules and 
principles to prevent quota concentration and absentee ownership, the vessel quota system, 
which officially began in 2007, led to quotas being shared among few holders and changing 
ownership structure with quota owners situating away from the fishing areas. Recent 
publications (cf. for example Pinkerton 2017; Winder 2018) report similar developments in 
other parts of the world. Small-scale fisheries often lose out when markets are self-governed 
in the absence of external interventions to correct for market failures.  
 
3.4 Dealing with transformation in the mixed mode 
Several case studies describe governing modes that do not entirely match with the ideal types, 
but to certain degrees deviate from these theoretical models. Such deviations tend to occur for 
contextual reasons. However, that does not mean that current governing systems are well 
adapted to the existing problem structure of a particular system-to-be governed. This is the 
case, for instance, with the Pacific Islands, as demonstrated by Cohen et al. (2015). Their 
analysis shows that neither the hierarchical governance nor the self-governance system 
through customary institutions is effective at dealing with contemporary resource use contexts 
and meeting sustainability goals. Drawing from their experience in Solomon Islands, they 




































































management’ system and customary institutions (or self-governance), as well as with 
hierarchical governance, are promoted. Such a system also benefits from engaging with 
NGOs and the scientific community in partnership arrangements that help build capacity and 
bolster conservation. For fisheries contexts that are undergoing rapid growth and 
intensification of resource exploitation, these authors conclude, a mixed mode of governance 
is particularly useful, fostered by mechanisms to promote cross-scale networks and multi-
level interactions. 
Another illustration of the need for interventions and new institutions is found in the 
Lake Winnipeg fishery in Canada. In the late 1960s, US-based traders had full control of the 
markets and thus the socio-economic condition of fishers, keeping them under severe debt and 
poverty (Johnson and Pálsson 2015). Through government interventions, a Freshwater Fish 
Marketing Corporation (FFMC) was instituted to nationalize the purchase of fish, forcing 
private traders out of the industry and eventually leading to a system of limited ITQs. In this 
case, the reversal is from a self-governance system that favors the private sector to another 
market-based system controlled by a national institution (a state-led initiative), which met 
with some dissatisfaction and perceptions of illegitimacy. While fishers acknowledge the role 
of the two institutions (FFMC and ITQs) in improving their livelihood conditions, they have 
issues with the inequalities of the ITQ system and the incapability of the governing system to 
encourage their engagement. The new Lake Winnipeg Co-Management Board is established 
to help improve interactions between fishers and governments, thus transforming the 
governance of Lake Winnipeg from a pure hierarchical governing system to an ‘in-between’ 
mode of governance. 
Tonle Sap in Cambodia is another lake system that underwent a ‘deep’ reform 
involving a ‘top-down’ decree that abolished the long tradition of the auctioned fishing lot 




































































than 100 years. The fisheries governance system in Cambodia is one of mixed modes, 
characterized by a ‘weak’ co-management arrangement called Community Fisheries, which is 
made up of locally elected management bodies that execute a fishery management plan 
approved by the state (Jones and Sok, 2015). The reform has resulted in an introduction of 
new actors and a change in power relations that affects the system’s governability. For 
instance, the added conservation and social safety net mandates demand higher capacity and 
coordination from the governing bodies (both at the state and community levels), which are 
structurally not feasible. Some positive signs have been observed with the creation of new 
community fisheries, with enhanced roles in enforcement and management, along with 
increased participation from non-state actors, including environmental organizations, civil 
society organizations, and donors.  
The mixed mode of governance can be attributed to the long history of small-scale 
fisheries governance, but is a mode with a highly dynamic history. Jentoft & Johnsen (2015), 
for instance, documented the series of institutional changes in Norway, starting with the 
existence of co-management since 1890s, and later with the Norwegian Fishers’ Association 
established in 1928 playing the key governance role in cooperation with the government. The 
passing of the ‘Raw Fish Act’ ten years later gave control of dockside sales and price setting 
to the fishers’ associations. Another major change occurred in 1990 when an individual vessel 
quota was introduced, and with it the change of the state’s role from reactive (amiable) to 
proactive (confrontational), with the state now having to set the quota and determine the 
allocation rules. The latest change came in 2014, with the re-introduction of the open access 
system for small-scale fisheries (using vessels less than 11 m), after years of complaints about 
the effects of quota allocation on their livelihoods. Nonetheless, for the most part fishers have 
been able to adapt and support measures and rules constituted by the state, given that they 




































































trust in the institutions, as well as adaptive capacity to cope with change. 
In Japan, the traditional, co- and self-governance system by fishing cooperative 
associations (FCAs) is giving ways to consolidation and merger, sometimes to the prefectural 
FCA level (Delaney 2015). The claim is that this consolidation, especially in the past twenty 
years, has made better administrative and financial sense, in addition to being more efficient 
in delivering services to members than the port-based FCAs. In order to govern FCAs 
operating at all levels (local, prefectural, and national), a hierarchical governing was instituted 
and has been responsible for pushing FCA consolidation to one per prefecture, as well as 
accommodating the change in demography due to the aging population of the fisheries sector. 
The FCA reform has resulted in the transfer of management responsibilities from local to 
regional organizations, leading to a ‘dis-embedding’ effect in social relations.  
An integrated management approach has been employed in some of the case studies to 
deal with the mixed mode of governance and changes in fisheries. Gerhardinger et al. (2015) 
describe the actions in Brazil associated with decentralized decision-making, participatory 
mechanisms, and an introduction of new instruments such as Environmental Protected Areas 
(EPAs). Because EPAs are often extensive, including both public and private lands, and tend 
to cross multiple jurisdictions, EPA governance requires different interactions and approaches 
including partnership between government and local actors and devolution of decision-
making power and autonomy to the bottom-up, multi-stakeholder management council. The 
study of the EPA in Santa Catarina, Southern Brazil by these authors reveals that, despite 
attempts for innovation in the governing structure, functions and processes, several challenges 
remain, begging for some reconsideration about appropriate scale and capacity of the 





































































Finally, the recognized need to integrate fish as part of food systems to address food 
security and poverty issues is another reason why governance transformation is required. 
Isaacs (2015) illustrates this using the case of snoek fishery in South Africa, which, in line 
with the broader transformation, has seen changes in fishing rights of small-scale fisheries. 
South Africa is one of a few countries in the world that legally recognizes small-scale 
fisheries and has put in place small-scale fisheries policy aiming to improve overall benefits 
to small-scale fishing communities. Yet, creating space for new entrants and integrating them 
into the system is a major challenge, and without necessary infrastructure, capital and 
business skills, these new entrants end up losing out to industrial companies, who are able to 
concentrate fishing rights in a few hands. Isaacs (2015) concludes that the problem is not only 
about food security but ‘food sovereignty’, which speaks to the need for local people to have 
control of their own food supply. This would require governance reforms that devolve powers 
to fisheries stakeholders and communities in a governing system that involves government as 
well, as enabling small-scale fisheries policies would be needed. 
 
4. Discussion 
The case studies presented above have different stories to tell from their particular contexts 
around the world. They also address the governability of small-scale fisheries and the 
difference that different governing modes make. It is worth noting that small-scale fisheries 
seems to be undergoing the same trend of shifting from the hierarchical, command and control 
approach to a more cooperative partnership based form of governance. Thus, also in small-
scale fisheries, we identified a move from government to governance, in line with the visions 




































































Indeed, the SSF Guidelines emphasize the governing role of small-scale fishers and 
communities. They also promote consultation and participation as one of their key principles. 
Co-management, or co-governance, is their preferred governing mode, in that it institutes 
many of the guiding principles of the SSF Guidelines, which enshrines stakeholder 
empowerment and participation. As our analysis also reveals, it is the mode toward which 
many states and fisheries communities gravitate. Thus, the SSF Guidelines are not necessarily 
breaking new ground. Rather, they provide normative support to governance transformations 
that are already underway in many countries around the world, as exemplified in this paper. 
Co-governance holds many promises when done well. For example, studies show that 
through increased collaboration and shared learning, higher compliance with regulations, 
community empowerment, and stakeholder buy-in can be expected (Jentoft et al. 1998; 
Wilson et al. 2003; Jentoft 2005; Berkes 2009; Gelcich et al. 2010). Many case studies 
discussed above provide ample evidence supporting stakeholder involvement in fisheries 
governance. On the other hand, they point to several problems with co-governance, such as 
increased social conflict and perverse incentives for resource exploitation (see also Castro and 
Nielsen 2001; Gelcich et al. 2006). Therefore, in addition to not having a ‘one size fits all’ 
formula for the co-governance mode, or any mode for that matter, changes are often required 
in order to enhance the capacity and quality of the governing system and for it to take on 
additional roles and functions such as those demanded for implementing the SSF Guidelines. 
For governability reasons, adjustment and adaptation to align with context is always 
important. This should not, however, exclude the need to challenge existing conditions and 
practices. Therefore, co-governance could also be an instrument for social transformation. 
The transformative interaction between the governing system and the system-to-be governed 
must be mutual; one of them should not be perceived as given. How they set the agenda for 




































































 Governance may work at any mode. Therefore, the need for changing to a different 
mode may not be apparent in a given situation. Only marginal change within the mode may be 
needed. Governance change can therefore be small and incremental, and may eventually lead 
to transformation of the governance system. However, with the right “transformative 
opportunity” (Unger 2004) change may be more fundamental and structural, representing a 
gradual transformative shift at a given point. Governance transformation can also be abrupt, 
as when the governing system undergoes a total reform, for instance when spurred by a crisis 
that calls for urgent actions. Likewise, a disjunction between governing orders may create 
pressure for change, as when current arrangements and practices of a particular mode are 
inconsistent with the meta-order guiding principles. According to the SSF Guidelines, change 
in the governance system at any order must be ‘appropriate’ to fit the local context, but must 
also be principled in order to be ethically sound. The coherence between orders within any 
mode is, according to interactive governance theory, a major governability issue, which, once 
adjusted, can lead to better performance and appropriate responses. Thus, in the evaluation of 
the SSF Guidelines and their implementation, the extent to which transformation brings 
coherence between the governing orders is imperative. In other words, whether meta-
principles are identifiable and the degree to which the design and performance of management 
institutions is consistent with these principles are salient issues.   
 As our study reveals, for the most part small-scale fisheries are subject to a mixture of 
governance modes, drawing different elements from each to suit a particular context. This 
implies a ‘hybrid’ or mixed mode of governance, which not only builds partnerships but also 
establishes a division of labor marked by different governance modes for different 
governability problems and management functions (Jentoft 2007). For instance, self-
governance may be appropriate for some but not for all functions. Given the diversity, 




































































they harbor, this is how it should be. This is also why the frequent ‘as appropriate’ clauses are 
included in the SSF Guidelines, suggesting reservation in the endorsement of governance 
reforms. Just like the system that it aims to govern, the small-scale fisheries co-governing 
mode has to be flexible and dynamic. The matching of the mode to the systems requires the 
governing system to be prone to change, willing to adapt, and open for transformation. 
Involving fishers, fish workers, and their organizations in co-governance can also mean 
different things depending on the context and local capacities. The SSF Guidelines start from 
the observation that small-scale fishers and fish workers find themselves in a marginalized 
and disempowered position. Yet, there are certain things that fishers and fish workers can do 
if, for example, they are better organized. To enable them to effectively participate in 
governance would most likely require more than a marginal adjustment in governance.  
 Our analysis of the case studies shows that modest transformation is fairly common in 
small-scale fisheries operating under a hierarchical governance mode and where the 
governing system is mostly occupied with addressing rudimentary problems. The case studies 
from the Netherlands, the Philippines, Ecuador, Colombia, Sri Lanka, and India (Cochin) give 
examples of fisheries with no significant transformation, even though they may have gone 
through some change. Similarly, small-scale fisheries in Lake Victoria, Malawi, Iroise Sea, 
St. Lucia, Barbados, and Norway seem to be finding their balance in the co-governance mode 
with appropriate institutions. Further, the co-governance system in Brazil and Japan, as well 
as the self-governance system in Thailand, are well supported by the rules and regulations that 
enable them to function. This does not imply zero change. Rather, the change is trivial since it 
may involve only cursory observations of principles and rhetorical legitimization of existing 
institutions and practices.   
 Many types of transformation can be categorized depending on their positions and 




































































governing system is situated, under a certain mode of operation, as well as the possibility of 
shifting to another mode. The Y-axis shows the order in which the governing system operates 
and suggests the directional movement. The degree of transformation can be marginal and 
basic or significant and extreme, moving back and forth along one or both axes at the same 
time. The evaluation of the implementation of the SSF Guidelines should be attentive to the 
fact that transformation could take up any of these forms and can be found in all directions, 
horizontally, vertically, and diagonally, and both forward and backward. 
 Our study captures the majority of transformation types but not all that could possibly 
take place according to Figure 1. Still, the study reveals great diversity in governance 
transformations that are taking place in small-scale fisheries around the world. Particularly, 
we identify eight unique types of governance transformation from the case studies. Type 1 - 
‘Enhancing Participation’ - attempts to involve small-scale fishers and stakeholders in 
addressing the problems associated with their occupation, heading from hierarchical to co-
governance mode but continuing to operate only at the first order. Examples of these are 
found in the case studies from Hawaii, Baja California, Portugal, Rote Island (Indonesia), and 
Newfoundland and Labrador. Type 2 – ‘Rearranging Institutions’, on the other hand, 
examines the reform of existing organizations or the formation of new institutions (2nd order), 
also while operating under the hierarchical mode. This is exemplified in the Cyprus case 
study. Type 3 transformation takes this a step further by attempting to move the governing 
system out of the hierarchical mode into co-governance, thus leading stakeholders to 
potentially realize the need to also elevate the order of governance from focusing on 
addressing daily challenges to the consideration of new institutional arrangements. We refer 
to this transformation as ‘Step-wise Navigation’. Examples of these are found in the case 
studies from Belize and Sierra Leone. Unlike Type 3, Type 4 – ‘Diagonal Navigation’ – 




































































governance, as well as from the 1st to 2nd order of governance. Such transformations can be 
observed in the case of Lake Winnipeg and Solomon Islands.  
 In some instances, appropriate institutions are designed, structured, and put in place by 
the hierarchical governing system. In order to operationalize them, involvement from 
stakeholders is required and thus the shift to co-governance is observed. This Type 5 
transformation, referred to here as ‘Legitimizing Institutions’, can be found in the case of 
small-scale fisheries in South Africa and Alaska. Next is Type 6, ‘Articulating Values,’ which 
reflects attempts to expound the inherent values of involved stakeholders and incorporate 
them in the reframing of governing institutions. This happens mostly when small-scale 
fisheries are governed under the co-governance or self-governance mode, such as in the case 
of Canary Islands and Senegal (co-governance) and in San Felipe, Mexico (self-governance). 
 Some transformation works in the opposite direction, as shown in Figure 1. Type 7 - 
‘Realigning Governance’ – is a movement from self-governance to co-governance. In the case 
of Zanzibar and Denmark, this is a reflection of the social and economic consequences of the 
implementation of ITQs for small-scale fisheries and their communities. Finally, in the case of 
Cambodia, we see an example of Type 8 transformation, which we would call ‘Rethinking 
Governance’. Here, small-scale fisheries are undergoing another potential reform, after the 
decentralization to community fisheries showing signs of troubles. This suggests that more 
engagement from the government authorities may be required, but in ways that also promote 







































































Figure 1 Types of transformation in small-scale fisheries governance. Type 1 - Enhancing 
Participation; Type 2 - Rearranging Institutions; Type 3 - Step-wise Navigation; Type 4 - 
Diagonal Navigation; Type 5 - Legitimizing Institutions; Type 6 - Articulating Values; Type 7 
- Realigning Governance; Type 8 - Rethinking Governance. 
 
5. Conclusions 
Our analysis aligns with the growing interest in the “new governance” (Rhodes 1976), 
captured by a range of observers as a transformative shift in the way governing is exercised, 
where a top-down, hierarchical mode is increasingly replaced by more interactive modes 
involving civil society and private sectors. As shown in this paper, small-scale fisheries are no 
exception to this rule. Indeed, it is a trend that the SSF Guidelines encourage. 
Drawing on “interactive governance theory,” our analysis starts from the assumption 
that both the system-to-be governed and the governing system are dynamic, that they interact 




































































undergo changes that are caused by and create wicked problems (Jentoft and Chuenpagdee 
2009). Social and ecological change may occur for external reasons, as with natural hazards 
or globalization, but they may also happen due to developments and interventions that are 
internal to the two systems and their interactions. Such change can be gradual or abrupt. In 
addition, they may be subtle and hard to observe. Therefore, they may go unnoticed or be 
ignored entirely, just like many small-scale fisheries, which the SSF Guidelines aim to avoid. 
However, when governance responses do occur, they always take place at various governing 
orders (first, second, and meta-), which in the process of intervention may result in 
transforming the governing practices and the institutional mechanisms that lead to change. 
Such a change may be evolutionary, incremental, adaptive, or additive, but may also take 
place in a short time span and cause fundamental, structural, and systemic shifts. The rate 
rather than the direction of this trend may, as Polanyi notes (see initial capture),  “well may 
depend upon us,” i.e. happen at our own will.  
In our analysis of small-scale fisheries governance, we have seen examples of how 
both the rate and the direction of the transformation can be determined through direct 
intervention. Interactive governance theory provides a perspective that enables us to see the 
diversity through which such change may occur. It also calls to attention the multiple 
directions of these changes, including forward and reverse processes, as well as their paces. It 
is possible that no change happens or that change is so insignificant that the system design 
and practices remain the same. In our paper, we have named eight unique types of change 
based on the case studies, but in reality there may be many more.  
Overall, our study reveals a trend in which governing systems are moving toward a 
more participatory co-governance mode, away from a top-down, hierarchical approach, where 
governments dictate, or from a self-governing mode where developments occur with no other 




































































a way of reducing the vulnerability of small-scale fisheries and communities. In most case 
studies, small-scale fisheries stakeholders are formally included in planning and decision-
making, where they voice their interests and negotiate the rules either directly or through their 
representatives. Still the issue remains in some cases, as not all relevant stakeholders are able 
to participate on an equal basis due to power inequality. 
As illustrated in Figure 1, for some transformation types, the governance practices at 
the first-order are changing. In other instances, institutions are redesigned or invented. We are 
also witnessing that the meta-order images, values, and principles underpinning management 
are subject to resumed, critical reflection. Fundamental transformation is taking place when 
small-scale fisheries governance undergoes change at all orders while shifting to another 
mode. Under which circumstance one or the other happens is a priority for future research. 
For example, one may assume that social and ecological crisis may play a role in such 
transformations. Power relations would be something to look for, as changing governing 
practices and systems never occur in a power vacuum. More generally, one should not only 
focus on the end-point but also on where governance transformation begins. Stakeholders may 
or may not perceive the need for transformation of the existing fisheries governance systems; 
in some instances only marginal change will do. Social, political, cultural, economic, and 
ecological contexts always matter; thus, there is always something unique about the system-
to-be governed and the governing system related to place and time. For this reason, the 
diversity of governance systems and practices in small-scale fisheries that exist globally is 
what one would expect to find. One should not presume that one governance mode 
necessarily works better than another, or that there is a single recipe for how to govern small-
scale fisheries that will work for all. That is something for research to determine. 
However, we must distinguish between the nature of change at different orders. At the 




































































would be slower since institutions must have a degree of stability and predictability in order to 
provide security to small-scale fisheries stakeholders. Instituting new rules and regulations, 
for instance, is assumed to be more demanding and therefore slow, as it leads to more 
systemic, permanent change. From a stakeholder perspective, such transformation has 
implications for their position within the system. Such decisions are therefore not as easily 
delegated to administrators because they cannot be routinized. Meta-order values and 
principles, on the other hand, are over-arching, which means that they are not subject to the 
same degree of pragmatism and opportunism, as would be the case at the lower orders. When 
the SSF Guidelines in paragraph 5.15 promote the idea that states should involve small-scale 
fishing communities in the design, planning, and implementation of management measures 
“as appropriate”, appropriateness is primarily for the first- and second-order. At the meta-
order, the SSF Guidelines underscore the application of the universal human rights principles 
as basic for small-scale fisheries governance, regardless of context. Therefore, for the 
progress that the SSF Guidelines hope to achieve, these transformations should be examined 
for each mode of governance, within the order that they occur, and for the coherence that they 
may bring between one order and the next. This is the topic that researchers and practitioners 
should follow-up on in their effort to contribute to the future sustainability of small-scale 
fisheries around the world.  
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